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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2735 
_____________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
DAVID TUCKER, 
                       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 08-cr-00756-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Stewart Dalzell 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 16, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
David Tucker appeals the May 28, 2010 judgment of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 120 months‟ 
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imprisonment, 5 years‟ supervised release, $2,145 restitution, and $200 in special 
assessments for committing armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and 
for carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1).  Tucker‟s counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion to withdraw 
and affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  
I. Background     
 On October 14, 2008, Tucker entered a PNC Bank and approached the tellers, 
brandishing a revolver.  While yelling threats and pointing the gun at the tellers, he slid a 
black plastic bag under the protective glass and demanded that they fill it with money.  A 
teller filled the bag with approximately $2,145 and slid it back under the glass.  Tucker 
took the bag and fled.   
 A week later, two FBI agents arrested Tucker for the robbery.  After waiving his 
Miranda rights, Tucker admitted to the agents that he had robbed the PNC Bank on 
October 14, 2008.  He was later charged with the robbery and firearms offenses as 
recounted above.   
 At a plea hearing on January 21, 2010, the District Court explained to Tucker the 
rights he would forfeit by pleading guilty and confirmed that he was entering his plea 
voluntarily.  Tucker then pled guilty to both counts.   
 At sentencing, the Court reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), 
which, based on Tucker‟s conduct and background, calculated an offense level of 19 and 
a criminal history category of II.  Those calculations resulted in a Guidelines range of 33 
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to 41 months‟ imprisonment for the armed robbery count, plus a mandatory consecutive 
term of 84 months for the firearms count.  Tucker did not object to those calculations.  He 
did, however, request a downward variance based on his post-offense cooperation and 
psychiatric history.  The Court considered Tucker‟s mental condition and his ability to be 
rehabilitated but, due to the seriousness of the crime and the unclear link between the 
crime and his mental condition, decided not to vary downward.   
Ultimately, the Court sentenced Tucker to 36 months for robbery “to be followed 
by 84 months as a mandatory consecutive sentence.”  (App. at 74.)  He was additionally 
sentenced to 5 years‟ supervised release and was required to pay restitution of $2,145 and 
special assessments of $200.    
Tucker timely appealed.  His counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief 
pursuant to Anders, supporting the motion.  Tucker has not filed a pro se brief.  
II. Discussion
1
 
 A.  Standard of Review 
Under Anders, counsel may seek to withdraw from representing an indigent 
criminal defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.  United States 
v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000).  We exercise plenary review to determine 
whether there are any such issues.  See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (noting 
that, in the Anders context, a court must conduct an “examination of all the proceedings” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Whether an issue is frivolous is informed by the 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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standard of review for each potential claim raised.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 
968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002). 
B.   Anders Analysis 
We implement Anders through our Local Appellate Rule (“L.A.R.”) 109.2(a), 
which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that 
the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the 
United States.  The United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant 
may also file a brief in response pro se. … If the panel agrees that the 
appeal is without merit, it will grant counsel‟s Anders motion, and dispose 
of the appeal without appointing new counsel. 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  We ask two principal questions when counsel proceeds under 
Anders:  whether counsel has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of L.A.R. 109.2(a) 
and whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.  
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).   
The first question – whether counsel has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of 
L.A.R. 109.2(a) – often turns, as it does here, on the adequacy of counsel‟s supporting 
brief.  To be adequate under L.A.R. 109.2(a), an Anders brief must (1) “satisfy the court 
that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” Youla, 
241 F.3d at 300; (2) identify issues that might arguably support an appeal, see Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); and (3) “explain why th[ose] issues are frivolous[,]” 
Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780.  “Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim[,]” but 
he or she must still conscientiously examine the record.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.    
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The second question – whether an independent review of the case raises 
nonfrivolous issues – requires us to examine the record to determine whether the appeal 
“lacks any basis in law or fact.”  McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 438 
n.10 (1988).   Where the Anders brief is adequate, we confine our review to those 
portions of the record implicated by the Anders brief.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 301.  Where the 
Anders brief is inadequate, we may expand our review to portions of the record 
implicated in the defendant‟s pro se brief or other filings that provide “guidance 
concerning the issues [the defendant] wishes to raise on appeal.”  Id.  Regardless of the 
adequacy of the Anders brief, we may affirm the District Court without appointing new 
counsel if we find, after reviewing the record, that the “frivolousness [of the appeal] is 
patent.”  United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 Here, counsel has identified in the Anders brief three potential issues for appeal: 
jurisdiction; the validity and voluntariness of the plea; and the legality of the sentence. 
Having reviewed the Anders brief, we are satisfied that counsel has conscientiously 
examined the record.  Accordingly, we confine our independent review of the record to 
the issues raised in that brief.  
  1.   Jurisdiction 
 The first issue raised pertains to the District Court‟s jurisdiction. The district 
courts have “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses 
against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  By perpetrating an armed bank 
robbery, Tucker was committing “offenses against the laws of the United States,” 
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specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 924(c)(1).
2
  Accordingly, the District Court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, and the issue is frivolous.  
  2.   Knowing and Voluntary Plea 
The second issue raised pertains to whether the District Court properly determined 
that Tucker‟s plea was knowing and voluntary.  To withstand challenge, a guilty plea 
must comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which embodies the “constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be 
„knowing‟ and „voluntary.‟”  United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 
2006).  A defendant asserting a Rule 11 error for the first time on appeal must show plain 
error, that is, error that is plain or obvious and that affects his substantial rights.  United 
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008).  Such error can be the basis for 
relief on appeal if failing to correct it would “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).     
Here, the guilty plea met the necessary legal requirements.  The District Court 
addressed Tucker personally in open court and confirmed that he understood the rights he 
was forfeiting, that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, and that he was 
pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily.  Given the District Court‟s thorough colloquy, 
and the fact that Tucker has neither sought to withdraw his plea nor suggested grounds 
                                              
2
 The elements of his crimes, including the jurisdictional elements, were admitted 
by Tucker in the plea colloquy.   
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for finding it involuntary or less than knowing, we see no error and thus no nonfrivolous 
basis upon which Tucker may challenge his guilty plea. 
 3.   Tucker’s Sentence 
The final potential issue pertains to whether the District Court properly determined 
Tucker‟s sentence.  We review the District Court‟s sentencing decisions for abuse of 
discretion, looking first for procedural error and then examining the sentence for 
substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Here, the record reveals no procedural or substantive problems.  The District Court 
did not miscalculate the Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as mandatory, or fail to 
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  Moreover, the Court gave meaningful 
consideration to Tucker‟s mental health issues and decided to deny his request for a 
downward variance in light of the seriousness of the offense, all of which is consistent 
with § 3553(a).  The sentence therefore was procedurally sound.  
Likewise, the sentence is substantively reasonable.  Our review must be, “to a 
great degree, deferential.”  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.  Because the District Court imposed a 
sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range that took into account, inter 
alia, Tucker‟s criminal history, his mental condition and the seriousness of his crime, 
there was no abuse of discretion.  The record, then, presents no nonfrivolous basis upon 
which Tucker may appeal his sentence. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the forgoing reasons we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and affirm 
the District Court‟s judgment.  
